Abstract. We aim at constructing adaptive oblivious transfer protocols, enjoying fully simulatable security, from various well-known assumptions such as DDH, d-Linear, QR, DCR, and LWE. To this end, we present two generic constructions of adaptive OT, one of which utilizes verifiable shuffles together with threshold decryption schemes, while the other uses permutation networks together with what we call loosely-homomorphic key encapsulation schemes. We then show that specific choices of the building blocks lead to concrete adaptive OT protocols with fully simulatable security in the standard model under the targeted assumptions. Our generic methods can be extended to build universally composable (UC) secure, and leakage-resilient OT protocols.
Introduction

Background
Oblivious transfer (OT) with adaptive queries, or adaptive OT for short, was first examined by Naor and Pinkas in [26] , in which there are a sender and a receiver. The sender holds n messages, and the receiver would like to retrieve k of them, one after the other, so that: (1) the sender does not know what the receiver obtains, and (2) the receiver gets nothing more beside the k messages. The key applications of this type of OT are in patent searches, oblivious search, medical databases etc.
The security notion capturing the above requirements has evolved in the literature. The notion of full simulatability was introduced by Camenisch, Neven, and Shelat in [3] , following the realworld, ideal-world paradigm. In the ideal world, there exists a trusted third party (TTP), to which the sender gives all of his messages. When a receiver wants to obtain a message, he simply sends the corresponding index to the TTP. On the other hand, in the real world, there is no TTP at all, and the protocol of adaptive OT is run by the sender and the receiver. The intuition of full simulatability is that the real world is indistinguishable from the ideal world, with respect to any poly-time adversary.
Camenisch et al. additionally provided us with some first constructions of adaptive OT which were fully simulatable, in both the random oracle model (ROM) and the standard model. In particular, they showed with a refinement that the scheme in ROM of Ogata and Kurosawa [29] achieved fully simulatable security. They furthermore gave a construction in the standard model, using q-based assumptions (in which q depends on n) in pairing groups. [3] q-strong DH and q-PDDH O(1) O(n) GH [10] q-hidden LRSW (UC secure) O(1) O(n) JL [17] q-DHI (RSA group) O(1) O(n) KN [19] DDH O(n) O(n) GH [11] decision 3-party DH (3DDH) O(1) O(n) KNP [20] DDH O(1) O(n) (more moves)
This work
(The O also hides the message length in the QR and LWE cases, which is assumed small compared to n. The value L in the LWE case, causing by a cut-and-choose zero-knowledge proof, is set so that the soundness error 2 −L is negligible.)
Our first method can be applied to any public-key encryption scheme E which satisfies two conditions: (1) It must be a homomorphic encryption scheme such that the message space is a group of prime public order; and (2) It can be used as a 2-out-of-2 threshold decryption scheme.
The first condition allows us to use the verifiable shuffle protocol of Groth and Lu [12] which is a 3-move honest verifier ZKIP for proving the relation between the tuples E(m 1 ), . . . , E(m n ) and E(m π(1) ), . . . , E(m π(n) ) , where π is a random permutation. However, we cannot obtain any adaptive OT even if we directly replace Neff's shuffle protocol by Groth-Lu's shuffle protocol into [20] . This is because the sender can compute π from E(m π(1) ), . . . , E(m π(n) ) . To overcome this problem, we use 2-out-of-2 threshold decryption. From this method, new adaptive OTs are obtained under the DDH assumption and the d-linear (d ≥ 2) assumption, respectively.
Our second method can be applied to any key encapsulation mechanisms (KEM) satisfying what we call loosely-homomorphic property. We use permutation networks for this case while we do not use threshold decryption. From this method, new adaptive OTs are respectively obtained from the QR, DCR, and LWE assumptions.
Theoretically, the generic constructions show that encryption, with some homomorphic property, implies adaptive OT.
Technically, we will later assume that the receiver never repeats its requests, which is not quite a strict restriction.
Our generic methods enjoy further extensions. In Sect.5.1, we show how to obtain UC-secure adaptive OT protocols, with a little loss in efficiency. Specifically, we use a transformation of Σ-protocols to UC-secure ones [15, 24] , with the help of a recent UC-secure commitment scheme [23] by Lindell. The communication cost becomes O(L) for soundness error 2 −L .
Furthermore, in Sect.5.2, we show an adaptive (and hence 1-out-of-2) OT protocol which is resilient to the randomness leakage of the sender's first step. As an independent work, Damgard, Hazay and Patra [8] recently considered a framework for leakage resilient two party protocols. However, they were unable to construct such a 1-out-of-2 OT (see Sect.6 of [8] ).
Preliminaries
Notations
Throughout the paper, OT n k×1 denote the adaptive OT with n messages of the sender and k choices of the receiver. ZKPK stands for zero-knowledge proof of knowledge, while ZKPM for zero-knowledge proof of membership. WIPK means witness-indistinguishable proof of knowledge. Furthermore, ZKPK{(x) : X = g x } means a ZKPK protocol showing the knowledge of secret x satisfying the equation; and similar notations for more complex ZKPK, ZKPM, WIPK protocols will be used.
Taking an element a randomly from a set A is denoted by a $ ← A. We use a[i] to indicate the i-th component of a. For example, when a is a bit string, a[i] is the i-th bit; when a is a tuple of elements, a[i] becomes the i-th element.
Fully-simulatable OT n k×1
We use almost the same presentation as [19] , and consider a weak model of universally composable (UC) framework as follows.
-At the beginning of the game, an adversary A can corrupt either a sender S or a receiver R, but not both of them. -A can send a message, denoted by A out , to an environment Z after the end of the protocol.
However, A cannot communicate with Z during the protocol execution. (This property makes the definitions weaker than standard UC security.)
The ideal functionality of OT n k×1 will be shown below. For a protocol Π = (S, R), define the advantage of Z as Adv(Z) def = Pr(Z = 1 in the real world) − Pr(Z = 1 in the ideal world)
where the real and ideal worlds are defined below.
The ideal world: there are a few parties consisting of the ideal functionality F adapt , an ideal world adversary A , and the environment Z. Also we have dummy sender S and receiver R . The parties behave as follows.
Initialization phase
Transfer phase i = 1, . . . , k 1. Z sends σ i to the dummy receiver R , where 1 ≤ σ i ≤ n. 2. R sends σ * i to F adapt , where σ * i = σ i if R is not corrupted. 3. F adapt sends received to A . 4. A sends b = 1 or 0 to F adapt , where b = 1 if S is not corrupted. 5. F adapt sends E i to R , where
After the end of the protocol, A sends a message A out to Z. Finally Z outputs 1 or 0.
The real world: Simply in this world, the protocol Π = (S, R) is executed as specified by its construction (thus without F adapt ). The environment Z and the real world adversary A behave in the same way as above. Definition 1. Protocol Π = (S, R) is secure against the sender (resp, receiver) corruption if for any real world adversary A who corrupts the sender S (resp, receiver R), there exists an ideal world adversary A who corrupts the dummy sender S (resp, dummy receiver R ) such that for any poly-time environment Z, the advantage Adv(Z) is negligible. Definition 2. Protocol Π = (S, R) is a fully simulatable OT n k×1 if it is secure against the sender corruption and the receiver corruption.
3 Generic adaptive OT from verifiable shuffles
Building blocks
Threshold PKE We need an 2-out-of-2 threshold PKE scheme TPKE, which consists of the following algorithms.
-TGen: Two parties S and R run a protocol so that they respectively obtain (pk, sk S ) and (pk, sk R )
where pk is the agreed public key and sk S , sk R are the shares of secret key. (The public key is needed for all algorithms below, and we omit writing it for clarity.) -TEnc(M ; r): output a ciphertext C for a plaintext M and a random coin r.
-TDec(sk P , C): for P ∈ {S, R}, output µ P which is the decryption share of the ciphertext C under secret key sk P . -TComb(C, µ S , µ R ): output a plaintext M by combining the input C, µ S , µ R .
We require the following properties on the TPKE scheme.
Homomorphism: Namely,
where ⊗, ⊕, are the operators on the corresponding spaces. Semantic security: We require that for all M , the ciphertext Enc(M ; r) for random r is (almost) uniformly distributed over the ciphertext space.
Verifiable shuffles Consider a set of ciphertexts C i = TEnc(M i ; r i ) for 1 ≤ i ≤ n of the TPKE scheme forming by S. Let I be the identity element of the message space. It is easy enough for R to choose a permutation π on {1, . . . , n}, and random s i to form the set of C i = C π(i) ⊗ TEnc(I; s i ) for 1 ≤ i ≤ n, so that both sets of ciphertexts contain the same plaintexts. The set of C i (1 ≤ i ≤ n) is called a shuffle of the original one. If the scheme TPKE is semantically secure, publishing the shuffle C i (1 ≤ i ≤ n) reveals nothing on the permutation π to S. Correctness of the shuffle is verified via the following protocol
which has efficient implementations for homomorphic encryption schemes such as ElGamal or Paillier 3 as shown in the work of Groth and Lu [12] . More generally, the results of Groth and Lu apply for homomorphic encryption schemes with the following properties:
Proper message space: the order of the message space does not have any small prime factor (say less than 2 80 ). Root extraction: from C e = TEnc(M ; R), it is possible to efficiently extract (m, r) such that C = TEnc(m; r) for every e co-prime with the order of the message space.
The protocols for verifiable shuffles given in [12] are statistical strong HVZK arguments of three rounds, and can be turned into fully zero-knowledge by standard techniques. The additional property below will be needed in proving sender security.
We require that µ S can be alternatively expressed as a function of pk, C σ , M σ , s π −1 (σ) , and sk R . Namely there exists an efficiently-computable function f such that we have
The OT protocol
Initialization:
1. The sender S and the receiver R run the protocol TGen so that they obtain a common public key pk; and S gets secret key sk S , R gets secret key sk R .The receiver R proves in ZKPK that he knows sk R corresponding to pk. 2. For 1 ≤ i ≤ n, S computes and sends
to R where r i are randomness used by TEnc. 3. The sender S then proves to R by ZKPK that he knows M i for all i. (This is equivalent to proving the knowledge of r i in our below instantiations.) 4. (Shuffling) The receiver R chooses a permutation π on {1, . . . , n} and randomness s i for 1 ≤ i ≤ n, and computes then sends to S for all i
where I is the unit element of the message space. 5. The receiver R proves to S in ZKPK that he knows π and s i (1 ≤ i ≤ n) satisfying the equation at Step 4.
The j-th transfer:
6. The receiver R obtains an index σ as input, and sends C = C π −1 (σ) to S. 7. The sender S checks C ∈ {C 1 , . . . , C n }, then computes and sends µ S = TDec(sk S , C ) to R. 8. The sender S then proves in ZKPM that he did the right decryption in the above step. 9. The receiver R himself computes µ R = TDec(sk R , C ), and then obtaining M σ by TComb(pk, C , µ S , µ R ).
To prove correctness of the OT, note that
which means C encrypts the plaintext M σ thanks to the homomorphic property of the threshold PKE scheme. Now, by the correctness of the threshold PKE scheme, TComb(pk, C , µ S , µ R ) is exactly M σ as required.
Theorem 1
The generic OT n k×1 from verifiable shuffles above is fully simulatable, if the TPKE scheme has semantic security.
The proof is postponed in Appendix A.
secure under the DDH assumption.
Instantiations from DDH and linear assumptions
OT n k×1 from the DDH assumption We will use the threshold ElGamal encryption scheme. The scheme works on a cyclic group G = (G, g, q) where g is the generator of prime order q, and has semantic security under the DDH assumption on G.
The TPKE scheme satisfies all requirements described in Sect.3.1. Our OT n k×1 instantiation from the threshold ElGamal encryption scheme is depicted in Fig.1 . In the figure, the element µ S = C [1] x 0 can be alternatively expressed as 4
, which is the formula needed when proving sender security. Since the threshold ElGamal encryption scheme has semantic security under the DDH assumption, thanks to Theorem 1, the OT n k×1 in Fig.1 is fully-simulatable under the same assumption.
OT n k×1 from the d-linear assumptions We also works on G = (G, g, q), and let us introduce some more notations. For two
Matrix-matrix and matrix-vector multiplications are defined in the same manner. Sometimes, the · operators are implicitly understood. Also recall that for u, u ∈ Z 1×l q , we have u
For d ≥ 2, the following PKE scheme, introduced by Naor and Segev [27] , has semantic security under the d-linear assumption.
The secret key is sk, and the public key is pk = (φ, ψ) for
The correctness of the PKE scheme comes from the equation (R · φ) · sk = R · (φ · sk). The semantic security of the PKE scheme implies that, given φ, ψ, the pair Enc(1; R) = (Rφ, Rψ) is indistinguishable from random over G 1×(d+1) × G.
We now present the 2-out-of-2 threshold variant of the above PKE, whose necessary properties are checked in Appendix B. The resulting OT scheme is given in Fig.2. -TGen: The parties S and R, using G, agree on the matrix φ ∈ G d×(d+1) . They then choose secrets sk S and sk R respectively in Z
Generic adaptive OT from permutation networks
We present OT n k×1 with O(1) communication cost for the transfer phase, while with O(n log n) for the initialization phase. The assumptions used for security will be DCR or QR. 4 Let us elaborate a bit on the formula. We have
The j-th transfer Choose index σ 
Loosely homomorphic KEM
A key encapsulation mechanism KEM consists of algorithms Gen, Encap, Decap as follows: Gen produces keys (pk, sk); Encap(pk) outputs (ψ, K) where ψ is the encapsulation of the key K; Decap sk (ψ) returns K as the decapsulation of ψ. We write Encap(pk; r) to emphasize the random coin r. We need the following conditions on KEM.
Semantic security: Suppose Encap(pk) = (ψ, K). Given pk, ψ, the key K is indistinguishable from random. Loose homomorphism: Given (ψ, K) and (ψ , K ), there are efficiently computable functions f 1 , f 2 such that
The former equation is used in proving sender security, while the latter is for the OT's correctness. It is clear that a KEM is loosely homomorphic if it is homomorphic (namely, satisfying
Let us now show some concrete examples of loosely homomorphic KEM. First example KEM DCR : Gen generates primes p, q, setting pk = N = pq, and sk = (p, q). Encap
Using sk, Decap sk (ψ) first computes r satisfying r N = ψ mod N , an then outputs K = (r N − ψ mod N 2 )/N . The computation ψ · ψ is normally defined over Z N .
The semantic security of KEM DCR comes from the DCR assumption. To show that it is loosely homomorphic, consider (ψ, K) and (ψ , K ) satisfying r N = ψ + K · N mod N 2 , and r N = ψ + K · N mod N 2 . Writing ψψ = S + T N mod N 2 , we have
so thatK = Decap sk (ψψ ∈ Z N ) = T + Kψ + K ψ mod N , which is the function f 1 . Moreover, since (ψ + KN )(ψ + K N ) = S +KN mod N 2 , the key K can be computed as
which expresses the function f 2 .
Second example KEM QR : To apply the recent 3-move ZKPK of Cramer and Damgård [5] , we will use an expanded version of the Goldwasser-Micali encryption scheme. In particular, Gen is the same as above, except that a quadratic non-residue y ∈ QN R +1 N is added to pk. The algorithm Encap takes K $ ← {0, 1} and r $ ← Z N , returning the key K and its encapsulation
The algorithm Decap sk (ψ), for 1 ≤ i ≤ , returns
is a quadratic residue modulo N ; otherwise returns K[i] = 1. The scheme KEM QR is homomorphic, and has semantic security under the QR assumption. In [5] , the protocol WIPK{(K, r) : ψ = Encap N ; (K, r) }, is realized by a Σ-protocol, with soundness error 2 − and communication cost O( ) (instead of O( 2 ) via the cut-and-choose technique). Turning the Σ-protocol into a fully zero-knowledge one with 4 moves can be done by standard techniques (e.g., see [7] ).
Third example KEM LWE : This is a variant of the Regev encryption scheme [31] . Gen generates
, and sets sk = s, pk = (A, As + x) where the noise x ∈ Z m×1 q is small, derived from a discrete Gaussian distribution. All computations are in Z q unless otherwise stated. Encap(pk) takes K $ ← {0, 1} and r 1 , . . . , r $ ← {−1, 0, 1} m×1 , and returns ψ = (RE (K[1]; r 1 
The OT protocol
We show that an adaptive OT n k×1 can be constructed from a loosely homomorphic KEM = (Gen, Encap, Decap). Initialization Phase 1. The sender S generates (pk, sk) ← Gen and sends pk to R. The sender proves that pk is a valid public-key by ZKPM. 2. For i = 1, . . . , n, the sender S generates (ψ(r i ), K i ) = Encap(pk; r i ) by choosing r i randomly and sends to R
where r i is a random string used by Encap. 3. The sender proves by ZKPK that he knows r i of ψ(r i ) for every 1 ≤ i ≤ n. Alternatively, he proves that he knows sk by ZKPK. 4. (Permuting and Blinding) The receiver chooses u i randomly for 1 ≤ i ≤ n, and generates
He then randomly picks a permutation π on {1, . . . , n}, computes U i = A π(i) · ϕ(u i ), and sends U 1 , . . . , U n to the sender. The receiver, equipped with secrets (u 1 , . . . , u n ) and π, proves in ZKPK that
We will describe in Sect.4.3 how to perform the ZKPK with O(n log n) communication cost.
The jth Transfer Phase 5. The receiver chooses an index 1 ≤ σ ≤ n, then sends U = U π −1 (σ) . 6. The sender checks U ∈ {U 1 , . . . , U n }, computesK = Decap sk (U ) and sendsK to the receiver. 7. The sender proves thatK = Decap sk (U ) by ZKPM. 8. Note that U = A σ · ϕ(u π −1 (σ) ). The receiver computes Theorem 2 The generic OT n k×1 from permutation networks above is fully simulatable, if the KEM scheme has semantic security. In other words, loosely-homomorphic KEM implies adaptive OT.
The proof is postponed in Appendix C. Below we will show how to obtain efficient instantiations based on specific complexity assumptions.
How to execute the ZKPK at Step 4
The case n = 2: First, let us focus on n = 2, proving the knowledge of u 1 , u 2 such that
for some permutation π on {1, 2}. The task is equivalent to proving
depending on whether π(1), π(2) = (1, 2) or (2, 1). Expanding further, what is proved becomes
The above are exactly four OR-proofs. If one can implement the interactive proof WIPK{(u) : U = A · ϕ(u)} by a Σ-protocol, then it is well-known that one can efficiently realize the OR-proofs also with Σ-protocols. Note that if u 1 , u 2 are known, then the permutation π can be extracted as well. Transforming Σ-protocols to ZKPK ones can be done by well-known techniques [6] . Therefore, the ZKPK for n = 2 in consideration can be implemented in four rounds, and we count its communication cost asymptotically as O(1). From 2 to general n: We will use the idea of n-permutation networks, which turn n inputs to n outputs, and the outputs are a permutation of the inputs. It is known that n-permutation networks can be built from 2-ones, which are called switches. There are constructions of n-permutation networks with O(n log 2 n) [4] or even O(n log n) switches [1, 9] . A comprehensive treatment on the topic can be found in [4, Chapter 28] .
The idea is now we replace the switches by the WIPK protocol for n = 2 described above. We need O(n log n) protocols as switches, and each protocol requires O(1) communication cost, so that the total communication cost becomes O(n log n).
Let us concretely illustrate how one proceeds from n = 2 to n = 4, using the permutation network depicted in Fig.3 of five switches. The elements W i , T i , U i are sent to the sender by the receiver 5 . The first two switches ρ and ν prove that
Consequently, the second two switches δ and η ensure
The final switch τ is between T 2 and T 3 , showing
To ease the illustration, let us take concrete switches τ = (2 3) (namely 2 to 3 and vice versa), δ = (1 2), ν = (2 4), and the others are identity switches. Denote U ∼ A if there is u such that U = A · ϕ(u), so that
which means (U 1 , U 2 , U 3 , U 4 ) blinds and permutes (A 1 , A 2 , A 3 , A 4 ) as expected.
Instantiations: As shown above, we just need to implement the atomic WIPK{(u) : U = A · ϕ(u)} by a Σ-protocol.
DCR assumption: Set ϕ(u) = u N mod N for u ∈ Z N , so that the atomic WIPK is similar to the GQ proof [13] . QR assumption: Set
The elegant result of Cramer and Damgård [5] gives us the desired 3-move WIPK with soundness error 2 − . LWE assumption: Set ϕ (u = (K, r)) = (RE (K[1]; r 1 ) , . . . , RE(K[ ]; r ) where RE is as in Sect.4.1.
The WIPK in [2, Sect.2.2] can be used to accomplish the task. The soundness error of the protocol is 2 − , yet ensuring that (K, r) satisfies the relation with a larger bound |K| ≤ 2 2 +log 2 , ||r i || ∞ ≤ 2 2 +log 2 . To ensure correctness, we set the threshold for semi-homomorphic KEM as K = R = 2 2 +log 2 ≤ c √ q/m for some constant c, which is easily satisfied.
How to execute other zero-knowledge protocols
The ZKPM at step 7, in the case of KEM DCR , is equivalent to proving r N = U +KN mod N 2 for some r, for which the 4-move ZK protocol can be found in [22] . For KEM QR , proving U = (yK [1] 
mod N ) for some r ∈ Z N is needed, which can be accomplished by the 4-move ZK protocol for the knowledge of square roots in [5] . We now turn to the necessary protocols for the validity of the public key. Proving y is a quadratic non-residue can be done in 4 moves as in [5] . What is left is how to prove the validity of N , namely N = pq for some distinct primes p, q. We proceed in two steps: first proving gcd(N, φ(N )) = 1 in 4 moves (see Appendix D), and then showing N = pq as required. Merging the moves of the former and the latter gives us the 4-move protocol for the validity of N . The latter protocol is accomplished as follows.
Proving N = pq in four moves: Suppose gcd(N, φ(N )) = 1 and N is not a prime, so that N = ν i=1 p i for ν ≥ 2, and let y ∈ J +1 N \ (Z * N ) 2 . Improving a cut-and-choose protocol in [18] , the following protocol proves that ν = 2.
1. The verifier sends random z 1 , . . . , z ∈ J +1 N to the prover. 2. The prover shows that there are (m i , r i ) ∈ Z 2 × Z * N satisfying
by the 4-move ZK protocol of Cramer and Damgård [5] , whose communication cost is O( ) elements in Z * N with soundness error 2 − .
The completeness, soundness, and zero-knowledge properties are checked in Appendix E. Now consider the case of KEM LWE . To prove that pk = (A, As+x) is a valid public key, the sender can show the knowledge of sk = s such that the lattice point As is close to pk[2] = As + x, using the protocol of Micciancio and Vadhan in [25] for the closest vector problem. This accomplishes steps 1 and 3. The ZKPM at step 7 can also be realized by this protocol as follows. The sender has to prove the knowledge of s such that Decap 
Extensions
UC-secure OT under the DDH assumption
Although being fully-simulatable, the schemes in previous sections is not UC-secure. The reason is that rewinding is used in the zero-knowledge proofs. Therefore, to obtain UC-secure OT protocols, it suffices to use UC-secure zero-knowledge proofs in our constructions.
Observe that all zero-knowledge proofs used in Sect.3 can be effectively realized from Σ-protocols. Therefore, if we can turn a Σ-protocol into a UC-secure zero-knowledge one, then we are done. Fortunately, such a transformation is presented by Hazay and Nissim [15] (see also [24] ) with the help of a UC-secure commitment scheme (e.g., by Lindell [23] ), with a bit sacrifice in efficiency. Let (a, c ∈ {0, 1}, z) be transcripts of the Σ-protocol, we roughly describe the transformation here for completeness. One needs to repeat the above L times to obtain soundness error 2 −L . Plugging this transformation into the instantiation in Sect.3, we obtain a UC-secure OT protocol under the DDH assumption.
(Note that the UC-secure commitment scheme of Lindell [23] is under the DDH assumption.) The trade-off for this higher security is the efficiency loss by a factor L.
Leakage-resilient adaptive OT under the DDH assumption
Let us re-consider the generic construction given in Sect.4, yet further assume that the randomness of the sender at the first step is somehow leaked. Namely, the randomness used to generate the secret sk is leaked. We show that if using leakage-resilient encryption, the resulting OT instantiation remains secure. Specifically, under the DDH assumption, consider the following KEM derived from Naor and Segev [27, Eprint, Sect.5.2]. The scheme is proved leakage-resilient with rate 1 − o(1).
. Set the public key pk = (g 1 , . . . , g , h) and the secret key s = (s 1 , . . . , s ).
, which equals h r . The KEM is homomorphic and leakage-resilient, so we can apply the result in Sect.4 to obtain a leakage-resilient OT protocol under the DDH assumption. The atomic WIPK used in the permutation network is to essentially prove the knowledge of r ∈ Z q satisfying C = (g r 1 , . . . , g r ). This WIPK and other required zero-knowledge proofs can be realized efficiently.
B The properties of the d-linear assumption-based threshold PKE
Correctness: The correctness of the threshold variant comes from the following equations Rψ = R(φ(sk
Following from below equations
Semantic security: The security of the threshold variant can be reduced to its original PKE as follows. Note that TEnc(1;
Suppose S is corrupted. In that case we have (Rφ, Rψ R ) is indistinguishable from random from the view of S, so is TEnc(1; R). Similarly, TEnc(1; R) is still random-like if R is corrupted. Therefore, even either S or R is corrupted, TEnc(1; R) still looks random. Proper message space: This (and the right below property) is for the usage the shuffle protocols of [12] . The message space is G of prime order q, which does not have small prime factors if q is big enough. Root extraction: Given C e = TEnc(M ; R) = Rφ, (Rψ)M with (e, q) = 1, we want to extract (m, r) satisfying C = TEnc(m; r). This is done by just putting m = M 
)φ, and hence
which is a function of what R has, as desired.
C Proof of Theorem 2
Lemma 5 (Receiver security) The OT n k×1 protocol in Sect.4 is secure against sender corruption.
Proof. For every real-world adversary A who corrupts the sender, we construct an ideal-world adversary A such that the advantage Adv(Z) is negligible. We consider a series of games as follows.
Game G 0 : This is exactly the real-world experiment where the sender is corrupted.
Game G 1 : This game is the same as the above game except that it extracts the secret key sk from the corrupted sender. It is easy to see that Pr(G 1 ) ≈ Pr(G 0 ).
The difference in this game is that U 1 , . . . , U n is chosen randomly and sent to the sender. Then the simulator for the corresponding ZKPK (at step 4) is run. It is clear that Pr(G 2 ) ≈ Pr(G 1 ).
Game G 3 : This is the ideal experiment in which A runs game G 2 with A. Since A extracts sk from A, it obtains M * i from C i for 1 ≤ i ≤ n and sends all the messages to F adapt . In each transfer, A chooses U randomly and distinctly from {U 1 , . . . , U n }. Moreover, if the ZKPM (at step 7) passes, A sends 1, otherwise sends 0 to F adapt . We thus have Pr(G 3 ) = Pr(G 2 ) and hence Pr(G 3 ) ≈ Pr(G 0 ), meaning the ideal and real worlds are indistinguishable, so that Adv(Z) must be negligible as required.
Lemma 6 (Sender security) The OT n k×1 protocol in Sect.4 is secure against receiver corruption. Proof. For every real-world adversary A who corrupts the receiver, we construct an ideal-world adversary A such that the advantage of the environment Adv(Z) is negligible. We consider a series of games as follows. First, game G 0 is the real-world experiment.
Game G 1 : This game is identical to the above game, except that it extracts the secrets u 1 , . . . , u n and π from the corrupted receiver. We have Pr(G 1 ) ≈ Pr(G 0 ).
Game G 2 : In this game, the index σ is extracted as follows. In the transfer phase, when the receiver sends U , the game searches for an index 1 ≤ ρ ≤ n such that U = U ρ . By the construction U = U π −1 (σ) so that ρ = π −1 (σ) and hence σ = π(ρ). We have Pr(G 2 ) ≈ Pr(G 1 ).
Game G 3 : In this game,K = Decap sk (U π −1 (σ) ) = Decap sk A σ · ϕ(u π −1 (σ) ) is alternatively computed asK = f 1 A σ , ϕ(u π −1 (σ) ), B σ M −1 σ , K π −1 (σ) . We have Pr(G 3 ) ≈ Pr(G 2 ). Game G 4 : In this game, all C i = (A i , B i ) are randomly chosen. By the semantic security of KEM, we have Pr(G 4 ) ≈ Pr(G 3 ).
Game G 5 : This is the ideal world in which A runs A as in game G 4 . The adversary A extracts σ as in game G 2 , and the index is sent to F adapt to obtain M σ . Then the keyK is computed as in game 
